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THE STATE UNIVERSITY, DUE PROCESS AND
SUMMARY EXCLUSIONS
Both federal and state courts have held that under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, public colleges and universities
must normally afford students both notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before taking such severe disciplinary action against them as
expulsion or long-term suspension.' At the same time, both the courts
and commentators have recognized that a public university can constitutionally suspend or exclude a student from a campus without notice and a hearing under exigent circumstances. 2 In California, Penal
Code section 626.4 authorizes state college and university officials to
exclude persons from a campus without notice and a hearing for periods not to exceed fourteen days "whenever there is reasonable cause
to believe that such person has willfully disrupted the orderly operation of such campus or facility." Any person who willfully and knowingly enters or remains upon the campus or facility in violation of the
withdrawal of consent is guilty of a misdemeanor.'
1. See notes 8-21 & accompanying text infra. The due process standards are
different as applied to private universities, since private universities usually lack the element of "state action" required by the due process clause.
2. See notes 34-40 & accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari in a case involving the summary suspension of high school students.
Williams v. Lopez, cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-898).
The case may well be influential in the area of due process as applied to public schools
but its future applicability to colleges and universities is highly questionable. At least
one court, in upholding the validity of the suspension of a high school student was
careful to distinguish cases involving college and university students. The court stated:
"There are significant factual distinctions between . . . a college suspension and a public school suspension. For example, in a college or university, teachers and students
are rarely in class for more than a few hours a day, whereas in the public school system teachers and students are in class throughout the day. While public school teachers and administrators would be called upon to miss class if a prior hearing is held,
the same is not usually true in colleges and universities. The disruption of the educational process that occurs as a result of a prior hearing therefore is less likely to occur
in the college than it is in the public school.
"Additionally, the consequences of a public school suspension are considerably less
serious than those which follow from a university suspension. . . . [Sluspension or
expulsion from a college or university may seriously affect a student's opportunity to
obtain a graduate or postgraduate degree, or otherwise achieve professional status."
Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 292-93 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 988, a'd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
3. CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.4 (West Supp. 1974). The statute states that college
officials "may notify a person that consent to remain on the campus . . . has been
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Penal Code section 626.4 was part of a wave of legislation enacted by several states in the late 1960's to aid college officials in
dealing with campus disruptions.4 This note will examine two major
effects this legislation has 'had on procedural due process in the context of campus activities. First, it has both increased and changed
the nature of the liabilities imposed upon students for the breaking of
campus regulations. For example, Penal Code section 626.4 imposes
criminal liability by making it a amisdemeanor to violate willfully a
valid exclusion order. A concomitant of -the increased liabilities imposed for misconduct is the requirement that students be afforded
greater procedural protection before any punishment may be imposed,
thereby making it more difficult for college officials to justify summary
action against students.
Second, and more significant, legislation such as Penal Code section 626.4 represents 'a judgment by the legislature that universities
are no longer to be considered "special enclaves" separate from the
larger society, but rather, members of university communities, particularly students, are to be held accountable for misconduct in the same
manner as other members of society. This judgment is contrary to the
currently prevailing judicial view that colleges and universities are to
be considered "unique" and that constitutional rights are to be applied
to them in light of "the special characteristics of the school environment."5 Thus, two branches of -the state, the judiciary and the legislature, are currently acting on the basis of contrary philosophies. This
note will propose that if legislation such as Penal Code section 626.4
is to be upheld, the courts' treatment of colleges and universities as
unique institutions must be revised.
In the context of the changes brought about by the rise of legislation aimed at campus disruptions, this note will also examine the
narrower issue of summary exclusion. Penal Code section 626.4 was
constitutionally challenged in Braxton v. Municipal Court,6 a case
which arose out of student unrest at San Francisco State College in
the fall of 1970. Petitioners had allegedly demonstrated against the
withdrawn . . ." but nowhere does the statute expressly require that the student be
given notice in the due process sense of being told the specific charges and grounds
upon which the exclusion is based.
The statute expressly states that consent to remain on campus shall not be "withdrawn for longer than 14 days from the date upon which consent was initially withdrawn." A student though, may submit a written request for a hearing, and if the student does so then the college "shall grant such a hearing not later than seven days
from the date of recipt of such request. ....
"
4. See notes 53-58 & accompanying text infra.
5. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (First Amendment rights). See notes 49-51 & accompanying text infra.
6. 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
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publication of articles appearing in the campus newspaper, and were
subsequently informed by college officials that consent for them to remain on campus had been withdrawn. They were later charged with
violation of section 626.4 for willfully entering and remaining on campus after receiving notice of the withdrawal of consent. Petitioners
argued that the statute 'was an unconstitutional violation of procedural
due process, but the court found -the statute -to be constitutional and
held that a prior hearing could be dispensed with "when necessary to
prevent significant injury to persons or property during an emergency
occasioned by a campus disorder." 7 In essence, the court measured
the constitutionality of summary action by an emergency standard.
Braxton v. Municipal Court stands for the proposition that the
procedural due process requirements of notice and a hearing are not
absolute as applied to students. Rather, -they must give way to the
interests of the public university to act summarily when threatened
with an emergency. This note will examine the justification for summary action, and in particular will discuss what constitutes a valid
emergency. It is submitted that notice and a hearing can be constitutionally eliminated only when two elements are present: (1) conduct which poses a substantial threat to the functioning of the university, and (2) circumstances which have made the holding of disciplinary hearings either impossible or highly impractical.
The Historical Perspective
Before the 1960's it was unclear whether the courts ever required
public colleges to give students notice and a hearing before taking
disciplinary action against them. Some courts implied that notice and
a hearing were required,8 while others implied they were not. Still
other courts, while upholding the sufficiency of the disciplinary hearings in the particular cases before them failed to reach the precise
7.

Id. at 154, 514 P.2d at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 907.

attacked on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad.

The statute was also

To meet these challenges

the court interpreted it to authorize summary exclusion only upon reasonable cause to

believe that the person excluded had (1) incited to violence or engaged in conduct
causing a substantial and material disruption of an educational institution incompatible
with the peaceful functioning of the campus, and (2) had committed unlawful acts proscribed by other statutes. Id. at 150 & 152, 514 P.2d at 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
Finally, to sustain a conviction under the statute the prosecution must prove "(1) that
the person excluded did cause a disruption, as herein defined, by illegal acts, and (2)
that he violated the exclusion order." Id. at 154-55, 514 P.2d at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr.
at 907.
8. Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887); State
ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
9. E.g., Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736
(1907).
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issue of whether such hearings were actually a constitutional requirement.'10
This issue was finally settled in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education." In 1960 a group of black students at Alabama State
College took part in civil rights demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama. A few days later, the Alabama State Board of Education summarily acted to expel -the students. The students brought suit in the
United States District Court alleging that their expulsion without notice
and an opportunity for a hearing violated their constitutional rights
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court dismissed the complaint, and the students appealed to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. There the court was squarely
presented with -the issue of "whether due process requires notice and
some opportunity for hearing before students at a tax-supported college
are expelled for misconduct."' 2 In a landmark decision, the Fifth
Circuit held that notice and opportunity for a hearing were constitational requirements.
In so holding, the court was careful not to imply that it was requiring a full-dress judicial hearing with all of the safeguards afforded
in criminal proceedings,' 3 nor did it attempt to formulate a precise list
of requirements for every disciplinary hearing. Instead, it chose to
expound general requirements, and stated that the "minimum procedural requirements" in each case would "depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties involved."' 4
The court did lay down guidelines for the case before it, however,
stating that "[tihe notice should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion ... "15
At the hearing, either before the Board of Education or an administrative official of the college, the student was to be allowed to present
his own defense and .to produce oral testimony or written affidavits of
witnesses. If the hearing was not before the Board of Education directly, "the results and findings of the hearing [were to] be presented
.
in a report open to the student's inspection."' 6
Dixon, in its narrowest sense, merely required notice and a hearing in the case of an expulsion. The question remained whether no10. For general discussions and summaries of these early cases see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157-58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
11. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).

12. Id. at 151.
13. Id. at 159.
14. Id. at 155.
15.

Id. at 158.

16.

Id. at 159.
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tice and an opportunity for a hearing would also be required with
lesser punishments, such as suspensions. Moreover, it still had to be
decided whether the requirements of particular hearings, such as the
right to produce witnesses, would vary with the seriousness of the
potential punishment, and if so, in what way.
The cases following Dixon grappled with these and similar issues. Step by step the courts extended the requirements of notice and
a hearing to incidents involving less serious punishments. For example, in Knight v. State Board of Education17 students were indefinitely suspended under a school regulation requiring suspension or
dismissal of any student convicted of a criminal offense involving personal misconduct. The students had been arrested and convicted of
disorderly conduct during a civil rights demonstration. Finding that
the students' conviction alone was not clearly indicative of personal
misconduct as required by the school regulation, the court held that the
students could not be indefinitely suspended without notice and a
hearing. 8 In Scoggin v. Lincoln University19 students were suspended
for the remainder of the school term after having allegedly participated
in a disturbance in the school cafeteria at which university property
was damaged. The court primarily dealt with the sufficiency of the
notice and hearing the students had been given, and in so doing clearly
required notice and an opportunity for a hearing before such a longterm suspension could be imposed. In still other cases, courts have
required a hearing prior to suspensions for periods as short as ten to
thirteen days.20 The end result of these and similar cases has been to
require an opportunity for a hearing before any suspension for a "substantial period of time."'"
In delineating the particular procedures to be followed in individual disciplinary proceedings, courts have refused to require all of the
safeguards contained in full-dress judicial hearings. For example, there
is generally no right to counsel,2 2 or to confront or cross-examine
witnesses.22 However, if the punishment is particularly severe, or if
17.

200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).

18.

Id. at 180.

19. 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
20. Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.), aff'g
'nem., 335 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (case involved high-school students and thus
is of questionable authority for colleges and universities); Stricklin v. Regents of the
Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257

(7th Cir. 1970).
21. Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972)
(high school suspension); See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L
REv. 1027, 1071 (1969).
22. E.g., Perlman v. Shasta Joint Jr. College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal. App.

3d 873, 879-80, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563, 567 (1970).
23. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
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other circumstances warrant, these or similar requirements may be
imposed. 4 For example, in Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,2 5 the court required that students who had been suspended following two nights of campus demonstrations be afforded a hearing at
which they would be permitted to have counsel present to advise them. 26
Generally, the cases have required that each disciplinary proceeding contain -at least four basic safeguards. 27 First, the student must
be given timely notice of the charges against him. In Dixon, for example, suoh notice was to contain a statement of the specific charges

that would justify expulsion.28

Second, the student must be notified

regarding the nature of the evidence against him. 29 Third, he must
be able to present his own defense, which may, under some circumstances, include the presentation of witnesses, affidavits, and exhibits
on his behalf.3 0 Finally, the student must be punished only on the
basis of substantial evidence. 3
As already indicated, these requirements generally apply only in
cases involving expulsions and suspensions for a "substantial period of
time." Where the punishment is less severe, the requirement of notice and a hearing are relaxed. Informal procedures amounting to
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133, 147-48 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
24. Id. at 147-48.
25. 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
26. Id. at 651.
27. Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (D. Kan. 1971), quoting
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1071-72 (1969).
See Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F.
Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
The case which probably required the least formal proceedings when a serious punishment was involved was Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla.
1963). The two plaintiffs were indefinitely suspended after being convicted of contempt in a state court. They were telephoned and asked to contact a disciplinary committee. They presented themselves to the committee the same day and were read a
letter which they denied receiving, advising them of the charges against them. They
were then allowed to answer the charges until they no longer had anything to say. Apparently at least one plaintiff was rather tongue-tied by the suddenness of the proceedings, as the respective hearings lasted only fifteen and forty-five minutes. It is highly
questionable whether such proceedings afforded either adequate notice or an opportunity to prepare or present an adequate defense, but in spite of this the court held there
was no violation of due process.
28. 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (dictum).
29. Id.
30. E.g., id. at 159; Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp.
649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
31. Id.
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little more than a discussion between the disciplined student and college officials have been upheld as adequate by the courts. For example, in Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College District Board of
Trustees3 2 a dean had instructed a student to follow prescribed procedures in inviting a group of socialists to speak at the campus. When
the student failed to follow the procedures, the dean told him to report to the president's office an hour later. The student did so and
met with the president, the dean, and other officials. After the meeting the student was suspended for three days and placed on disciplinary probation. The court held that the hearing did not violate due
process, indicating that when minor punishments are involved, the
courts will not interfere as long as the hearing is fair.33
Summary Exclusion/Exigent Circumstances
As the courts extended the requirements of notice and a hearing
to punishments less onerous than expulsions, the question remained
whether, and under what circumstances, purely summary action would
still be permissible. Although litigation on the issue was infrequent,
courts often recognized that exigent circumstances could justify summary action. In Stricklin v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin,34
for example, the court indicated that in situations threatening harm to
the physical and emotional well-being of the disciplined student or
others, or damage to university property, summary action would be
justified where it was "impossible or unreasonably difficult" to provide
a hearing prior to a temporary suspension. 35 In Gardenhire v. Chalmers36 the court stated that the university could suspend a gun-carrying student on its campus without notice and a hearing on a temporary
basis for a reasonable time; the court indicated that five to fifteen days
would be a reasonable time. 7 Similarly, in Scoggin v. Lincoln Uniersity38 the court stated that the university could remove students
from the campus without notice and a hearing when their conduct
threatened to reduce the campus to a state of chaos.3 9 Both university
and student groups have accepted the validity of summary action un32. 9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970).
33. Id. at 879, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 567. In addition, courts draw a distinction between dismissals based upon misconduct and dismissals for academic reasons, and generally do not apply procedural due process requirements to purely academic decisions.

See Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1069 (1969).
34. 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).

35.

Id. at 420.

36.

326 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Kan. 1971).

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1204-05.
291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
Id. at 172.
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der the circumstances outlined in Stricklin.40
In summary, the procedural due process requirements in campus
disciplinary proceedings can analytically be divided into three levels.
First, when serious penalties are imposed, notice and a hearing containing basic procedural safeguards are to be afforded. Second, where
less severe or temporary punishments are involved, informal proceedings -are permissible as long as they are fundamentally fair. Third, in
certain exigent circumstances the possibility of summary action is recognized.
The Rationale of Due Process
This wide divergence in the scope of the procedures required results from the test the courts use in applying procedural due process
rights to students on college campuses. As stated by the court in
Dixon, the requirements of due process in each case "depend upon the
circumstances -and the interests of the parties involved.""' In other
words, the courts must look at the specific interests of both the university and the student involved in each case. To determine if a particular procedure is fundamentally fair, and therefore valid, the court
must balance the school's interest in maintaining the procedure against
the gravity of the harm caused the student by -the imposition of the
punishment involved. The gravity of the harm wil in turn help determine the extent of the procedural protection to be given the student;
the greater the potential harm the greater the protection required.
A classic statement of the application of this balancing test was
given by Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGrath42 from which the Dixon court quoted:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected,
the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is
challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished-these are some
4 3 of the considerations that must enter into
the judicial judgment.
Under this test there is no precise standard, no set list of requirements
40. Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 AM. Ass'N UNIv.
PROFESSORS BuLL. 365, 368 (1967). See Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235 (D.Md.
1971), where a Maryland statute, distinguishable from Penal Code section 626.4 in that
it allowed for summary exclusion of only non-students or non-university personnel, was
considered valid if applied in an emergency situation where a hearing would be impractical.
41. 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961).
42. 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 163, quoted in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
155 (5th Cir. 1961).
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to which a court may look in deciding a school disciplinary case.
Rather, it is only by examining the facts of each particular case that
a court can determine what disciplinary procedures are to be required.
This test is highly flexible, and eaoh case presents a new and different
problem.
The Interests Involved
The crucial factors determining the procedural rights of college
students are thus the conflicting interests of colleges and students that
44
are affected when the courts require formal disciplinary procedures.
The primary interest of the student that needs protection from arbitrary and unwarranted action by the university is his education. An
individual's life-time income can be greatly affected by his level of
education.4 5 Moreover, the educational process itself is expensive, and
any disruption of it may entail increased financial burdens by increasing the duration of the educational process.
Further, to punish a student for alleged misconduct is to label
him as irresponsible and a troublemaker. This can damage his status
and sense of self-worth, as well as limit him in his choice of future
pursuits.
The same consequences arise if the punishment imposed denies
a student an education or disrupts it, because in the eyes of society a
person's level of education is often seen as an indication of his achievements and abilities. Finally, an education in and of itself may be an
important part of a full life by allowing for deeper and more satisfying
involvement in countless activities and pastimes, including art, literature, and music. All of these factors weigh heavily on the student's
side in the balancing process, and call for the courts to afford students
formal procedural protections in disciplinary cases. 4 6
On the other side of the scale are the interests of the university.
Every university has a basic need to exercise disciplinary authority in
order to maintain a functioning institution. The more complex and
intricate the procedures that the courts require, the more time, energy,
44.

For general discussions of the interests involved, which parallel much of the

following text, see Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 573-77 (1971); O'Toole, Summary Suspension of Students Pending a Disciplinary Hearing: How Much Process is Due? 1
J. LAW & EDuc. 383, 399-409 (1972).

45. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 575 (1971), citing BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 108 (1969).
46. Moreover, society has an interest in the education of its members since an
education may be important in order "to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of good citizens." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
157 (5th Cir. 1961).
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and money that will be drained away from other university activities.
Moreover, the functions of discipline -and punishment are often seen
by educators as inseparable from the -functions of guidance and counseling. 47 The decision as to when to discipline a student, and in what
manner, may thus entail intricate considerations and judgments about
the individual involved. In order to make discipline effectively serve
the functions of guidance and counseling, educators feel that the procedures involved must be informal and flexible.48 Only -then can the
proceedings be tailored to fit the individual.
These ideas are closely intertwined with the university's own selfimage. It often thinks of itself as an enclave separate from 'the larger
society, a special community bound together by its scholarly activities,
where disputes are to be settled by reasoned discussion and common
understanding. In this "community of scholars" both mundane administration and broader academic pursuits are bound together by the
notion that everything is part of the learning process. To force adversary proceedings upon such a community is to threaten this delicate
balance -andto upset the unique educational atmosphere.
Indeed, both the courts and -the commentators share this view of
the university as a special enclave. They argue that in applying constitutional rights to colleges and universities, courts should not be
guided by analogies to criminal or administrative law;4 9 instead, constitutional rights should be applied to educational institutions only
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.150
To require educational institutions "to recognize and enforce precisely
the same standards and penalties that prevail in the broader social
community would serve neither the special needs and interests of th6
educational institutions, nor the ultimate advantages that society derives therefrom." 51
The university's interests in flexible informal procedures can be
divided into two types. The fact that formal disciplinary proceedings
can drain off vital time, energy, and money is an objective considera47. See, e.g., Monypenny, University Purpose, Discipline, and Due Process, 43
N.D.L. REv. 739, 748 (1967).
48. See, e.g., id.
49. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1082
(1969); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133, 142 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
50. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969). Tinker itself involved First Amendment rather than due process rights,
but the courts express a similar attitude in the area of due process when they speak
of the inappropriateness of drawing analogies to criminal or administrative law.
51. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 880, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967).
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tion, an indisputable fact of any large institutional organization whose
resources are limited. On the other hand, other considerations are
not similarly objective. For example, the widespread beliefs that discipline and guidance are inseparable, that the university requires flexibility and informality in order both to carryout these functions and to
foster cooperation and community, and that these factors are in turn
vital to the educational process-these are not requirements inherent
in the institution. Rather, they are important because they are components of a deeply ingrained educational philosophy which says they
are important. The tendency of the courts to speak of the university
as "unique" is partly a statement of that philosophy. Thus, when
courts balance the university's interests it is not merely the institution
that is being protected, but also the underlying philosophy itself.
The Effects of Campus Legislation
Both the interests of the university and the student have been
significantly affected in recent years by the rise of legislation designed
to deal with campus disruptions, of which Penal Code section 626.4
is a part.12 California, for example, has enacted legislation which
allows state colleges and universities to withdraw state financial aid
from students who, after a hearing, have been "found to have willfully and knowingly disrupted the orderly operation of the campus
...
,,5
Another statute recognizes the university's inherent power
to refuse financial aid because of misconduct which in the college's
judgment "bears adversely on [a student's] fitness for such assistance." 4 A penal statute imposes criminal liability for the bringing or
possession of a firearm on a college campus without permission. 5 Another imposes criminal liability for entering a university after having
been suspended or dismissed following a hearing and having been
denied access to the college as a condition of the suspension or dismissal. 6 A recent Florida statute authorizes its state university to
take into account any past misconduct by a student when considering
admission.17 Presumably this would apply to graduate as well as undergraduate programs. Penal Code section 626.4 itself imposes criminal liability for what is essentially the breaking of a college regulation,
52. For an overview of the various types of legislation enacted see Note, State
Legislative Response to Campus Disorder: An Analytical Compendium, 10 HOUsrON
L. REv. 930 (1973).
53. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1974). However, the financial aid
may only be withdrawn for the ensuing two academic years.
54. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 31293 (West Supp. 1974).
55. CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.9 (West Supp. 1974).
56. CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.2 (West Supp. 1974).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.052 (West Supp. 1974).
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disobeying a valid exclusion order.58
The -primary effect of this legislation on campus procedural due
process is both to change and to increase the liabilities imposed upon
students for misconduct. The withdrawal of financial aid for many
students is tantamount to expulsion, since without it they will be unable to continue in school. The denial of admission to a state university because of past misconduct is the same as closing the door to undergraduate or graduate education for students who are only able to
attend state universities. The imposition of criminal liability for misconduct threatens a student with ,the possibility of fine or imprisonment. In addition, it could result in -a student having a police record
which could diminish his future employment prospects as well as damage his status and sense of self-worth.
Each of these possibilities should weigh heavily on the student's
side when the courts consider the validity of disciplinary proceedings.
Recognizing this, some of the preceding statutes specifically require
hearings before sanctions are imposed against students. 59 In -addition,
the Braxton court read an additional safeguard into Penal Code section
626.4 by stating that before a student could be convicted of violating
an exclusion order, it had to be shown that the student -had originally
committed unlawful acts that would have justified the university in
excluding him from the campus.6"
These safeguards, however, do not lessen the importance of affording a student procedural protections at each stage of proceedings
that could lead to more serious sanctions. For example, if a student
is punished for misconduct without notice and a hearing, and it is
later determined that his financial aid should be withdrawn, it is a poor
substitute to offer him a hearing only at that stage of the proceedings.
If he had been given a hearing at the time of the original misconduct
it might 'have been determined that he was guilty of no wrong; then
the issue of financial -aid might never have arisen. In the meantime,
the student 'has the threat of losing his financial aid hanging over his
head. As another example, if a student is excluded from a campus
without a hearing under Penal Code section 626.4 and it later turns
out the exclusion was not justified, the student cannot be convicted of
a misdemeanor for violating the order. However, the student may
still be excluded from the campus for as long as fourteen days, and
if he chooses not to risk criminal liability by violating the order, the
exclusion is an effective sanction against him. He cannot reenter the
58. For additional California criminal statutes concerning colleges and universities see CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 626.6, 626.8 (West Supp. 1974).
59. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1974).

60.

10 Cal 3d at 154-55, 514 P.2d at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
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campus during the period of the exclusion except under the threat of
criminal liability. 61
By passing such legislation the state thus creates a paradox which
the legislature apparently neither intended nor foresaw. 2 - The statutes
are primarily designed to ensure the effective functioning of colleges
and universities by helping college officials deal with disciplinary problems. At the same time, by increasing the liabilities that may be imposed for misconduct, the statutes increase the interests of the students
which must be protected from arbitrary and unwarranted actions by
the university. This requires more formal and thorough disciplinary
procedures at each stage of disciplinary proceedings that might lead to
serious sanctions. However, such procedures can be expensive and
are contrary to the ideals of informality and flexibility thought necessary by many for an effective college education. Thus, while the
legislation on the one hand may help universities to carry out their
educational functions, on the other hand it may hinder them. In light
of this, it may well be that the legislation was ill-advised.
In addition to increasing the liabilities imposed for misconduct,
and thereby necessitating that students be given greater procedural protection, the legislation has a second major impact on campus procedural
due process requirements-an impact equally unintended and unforseen by the legislature." As noted earlier, the university's need for
flexibility and informality, and the sense of its uniqueness and separateness from the rest of society, are part of an underlying educational philosophy. It is this philosophy which is being protected when
the courts balance the interests of the university against those of the
student, especially when the courts indicate that the balance must be
struck in light of the unique characteristics of the school environment.6"
Penal Code section 626.4, and the legislation of which it is a
part, are manifestations of a contrary philosophy. In essence, the legislature is saying that college communities are no longer to be treated
as special enclaves, but rather that their members, particularly students,
are to be held accountable for their actions in the same manner as is
the rest of society. It may well be valid to say that students should
not be permitted to escape criminal liability for actions that are usually
61. The only exception under the statute is that a student may enter the campus
"for the sole purpose of applying . . . for the reinstatement of consent or for the sole
purpose of attending a hearing on the withdrawal." CAL. PZN. CODE § 626.4 (West
Supp. 1974).
62. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CAMPUS DISTURBANCE, JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY, Regular Session (Supp. App. 1969) (legislative intent of statutes
aimed at campus disruptions).
63. Id.
64. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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criminal; however, with that argument must go the corresponding
proposition that universities must lose part of their uniqueness, and
that the carefully constructed shield between the university and the
rest of society must consequently be pierced.
The state then, is left expounding contrary philosophies. One
arm of the state, its judiciary, contends that the uniqueness of the university is an important interest to be protected when considering the
application of procedural due process requirements to college campuses.
On the other hand, the legislature says that the university is 'to be
brought into conformity with -thestandards governing the larger society
and that its uniqueness cannot serve as a bar to such conformity.
The Rationale of Summary Exclusion
The most distinguishing feature of summary exclusion is that it
dispenses with all the usual procedural requirements of due process.
In addition, it generally applies where the punishment, though severe,
is short-lived. Penal Code section 626.4 concerns temporary exclusions not to exceed fourteen days,6" and cases dealing with summary
procedures usually involve similar short-term or temporary suspensions. 06

There are two different approaches to the problem of how to
justify summary action by universities. The first may be termed a
"no substantial harm" rationale. 67 As previously noted, -the requirements of notice and hearing were first applied to expulsions, and were
later extended on a case-by-case basis to lesser punishments until they
were required for any suspension for a substantial period of time. 68
But if the areas of summary action are restricted to temporary suspensions, arguably the punishment is not so severe as to qualify for procedural protection.
The primary focus of the "no substantial harm" approach is upon
the student's interest. The validity of a university's summary action
is mainly determined by looking at the severity of the sanction imposed
upon the student. The student's conduct need not involve a direct
primary threat to the university. Rather, the university's 'protection is
involved only indirectly by being able to maintain a functioning sys65. The section reads in part: "In no case shall consent be withdrawn for longer
than 14 days . . . . The person from whom consent has been withdrawn may submit
a written request for a hearing on the withdrawal within the two-week period ....
The chief administrative officer shall grant such a hearing not later than seven days
from the date of receipt of such request. .. ."
66. E.g., Stricklin v. Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis.
1969); see, e.g., Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1204-05 (D. Kan. 1971).
67. The term is the author's own.
68. See notes 8-21 & accompanying text supra.
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tern for day to day disciplinary problems. Under this analysis, the
primary purpose of the discipline can be viewed as punishment, with
the punishment designed to encourage adherence to the university's
69
regulations and perhaps to educate the student to his responsibilities.
The second approach, -that adopted by the court in Braxton, is an
"emergency" standard. The primary focus of this analysis is not upon
the interest of the student, but upon that of the university. An "emergency" implies a crisis threatening the very functioning or existence of
the university itself. Thus, the validity of a university acting summarily will be primarily determined by looking at the extent to which
a student's conduct poses a threat to the university's day-to-day functioning. The university's interest in summary action is not simply to
discipline its students, but also to protect its institutions. Thus, the
sanction of a temporary suspension or exclusion may not be designed
as a form of punishment, but rather as a self-protective measure. In
short, in the "no substantial harm" rationale the focus is primarily
upon the severity of the punishment; in the "emergency" approach the
focus is upon the conduct of the student.
Guidelines for Summary Exclusion
The question remains: How should courts strike the balance of
procedural due process in future litigation involving summary exclusions? First, the "no substantial harm" rationale should be discarded.
From the very fact that summary exclusions involve "exclusions" it
69. In Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (1971), ai'd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971), the court essentially followed this approach in a case involving a high school student who was suspended for 10 days without notice or a hearing for allegedly failing to stand during
a flag salute ceremony. The suspension was authorized under a regulation of the Board
of Public Instruction. Plaintiff attacked the regulation as an unconstitutional violation
of procedural due process, but the court disagreed. It reasoned that the basic question
was whether the procedure was necessary to "alleviate interference with the educational
process," and recognized that summary action was permissable during a riot or other
emergency. Id. at 291. It then extended this argument by saying a hearing, prior to
the suspension, itself produces a disruptive effect upon the educational process which
could not be permitted. Id. at 291-92. Essentially then, the court was protecting the
school's ability to maintain a functioning system for everyday disciplinary problems,
and considered a 10 day suspension as too minor a punishment to override that interest.
The court was careful to point out, however, that it was dealing with public school
rather than college students, and that with the latter the consequences of a suspension
would be more serious. Id. at 292-93.
A year later, in Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1971), another court was presented with a similar attack on another part of the regulation which authorized the school board to impose an additional 30 day summary suspension on top of the 10 day suspension. While recognizing that the 10 day summary
suspension had been upheld, the court felt the additional 30 days was a penalty of too
great a magnitude to be imposed without notice and a hearing. Id. at 301-02. Thus,
the severity of the punishment had shifted the balance to the side of the student.
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can readily be argued that the punishment is never really insignificant.
Moreover, even the most short-lived of exclusions is generally imposed
because of serious misconduct. The exclusion in the eyes of society
is a confirmation of the student's involvement in -the misconduct and
labels him as "irresponsible" and "troublesome. ' 70 But most of all,
the rise of campus legislation has significantly altered the balance of
interests. The summary exclusion can now be the first step in the imposition of criminal liability. "Misconduct" has been recognized as a
factor in the dispensing of financial assistance, increasingly scarce in
recent years, as well as a criterion in determining eligibility for admission. Furthermore the standard itself is unduly uneven ,as applied.
The same punishment can lead to vastly dissimilar consequences depending upon the student involved, his financial condition, his year in
school, his future educational and career goals, and his own self-image.
For example, while a summary exclusion might have little effect on a
wealthy student who plans to take over the family business, it might
have dire consequences for a poor student, dependent upon financial
aid, who is struggling to get into a state graduate school.
The emergency rationale, as an alternative, provides a more precise and workable standard which recognizes the true issues involved
in summary exclusion. Penal Code section 626.4 was adopted not as
a simple component of -any general scheme of campus regulations,
nor as an aid to the quick handling of day-to-day disciplinary problems. Rather, its passage was a direct response to violent disturbances which had closed educational institutions, and which were
threatening their continued existence. 7 1 It was a statute aimed at dealing with just such emergencies.7 2 In essence, it was a self-protective
measure for state colleges and universities.
The emergency rationale recognizes this self-protection function
and focuses on violent disruptions. By requiring an emergency to
justify summary exclusion, it requires no more than that for which -the
statute was enacted. Viewed in this light, the first component of the
emergency standard is the requirement that a student's conduct pose
a substantial -threatto the functioning of the university.7
70. The Supreme Court has become increasingly protective of a person's reputation, as exemplified by the following quote: "Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential . . . ." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
71. see REPORT OF THE SELECT CoMMrrFE ON CAMPUS DISTUPBANCE, JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY, Regular Session (Supp. App. 1969).
72. The court in Braxton recognized these purposes of Penal Code section 626.4
and interpreted the statute in light of them. 10 Cal. 3d at 144 & 154, 514 P.2d at
700 & 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 900 & 907.
73. The extent to which a student's conduct poses a threat to the functioning of
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This threat by itself, however, should not be enough to justify
the summary action. A major drawback of Braxton was its failure
explicitly to go beyond the sole requirement of an emergency threatening significant injury to persons or property.74 Such an emergency,
by itself, may not make impossible the holding of hearings. If the
university, even in the context of a qualifying emergency, is capable
of readily providing disciplinary hearings, such hearings should not be
brushed aside. A second component of the "emergency" should be
recognized: the impossibility or impracticability of holding disciplinary proceedings. Indeed, both the lower court in Braxton7' and other
76
courts have recognized such a requirement.
Another factor favors the use of the "emergency" rather than the
"no substantial harm" approach. The basic reason for requiring notice and a hearing in the first place is the importance of protecting
a student's education from unwarranted intrusions by the university.
In essence, notice and a hearing are required only because a student's
education is considered a vital interest worthy of protection. During
a campus emergency, however, it is not only the education of the
excluded student that is threatened, but also the education of every
student at the campus. If the college is closed or disrupted by disturbances, their education may be temporarily stopped or disrupted
just as effectively as if they themselves had been excluded. Thus during an emergency, the importance of protecting the education of each
and every student may demand that the university be able to act
swiftly and summarily against disrupting students. But this factor is
only present during an emergency threatening the day-to-day functioning of the institution. The emergency rationale takes this into account; the "no substantial harm" approach does not.
It should also be recognized that the choice involved in summary exclusions is not solely between affording a student a full hearing at which he can present witnesses, affidavits, and exhibits on his
the university will vary depending upon the circumstances in which the conduct takes
place. For example, conduct which poses no threat to the functioning of the university
during a time when the campus is functioning normally may pose such a threat during
a time of campus disruptions.
74. See note 75 infra.
75. Braxton v. Municipal Ct., 1 Civ. No. 29607, 4-5 (Ct. App. 1st Dist., Feb.
25, 1972).
76. E.g., Stricklin v. Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (W.D.
Wis. 1969). While the court in Braxton did not explicitly require that the holding of
disciplinary hearings be impractical or impossible for summary action to be allowed,
it implied that such impossibility was required when it stated that a hearing must be
held "as soon as reasonably possible .... ." 10 Cal. 3d at 145, 514 P.2d at 700, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 900. Under such a requirement, it is difficult to conceive how summary
action would be permissible unless it were not reasonably possible to hold disciplinary
hearings.
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behalf, or affording him no hearing at all. As previously noted, the
requirements of a hearing vary widely from formal procedures to what
amount to little more than informal discussions between college officials and disciplined students. Aware of this, at least one court has
adopted the concept of the "preliminary hearing.' ' 77 Under -this approach, during circumstances threatening injury to persons or property, a university may temporarily suspend a student after affording
him only a preliminary 'hearing.78 The preliminary hearing need not
contain all the elements usually involved in formal hearings after which
serious sanctions are imposed, such as the presentation of witnesses.
Rather, in a preliminary hearing university officials are merely required (1) to make an evaluation of the -reliability of the information
they have received; (2) to inquire whether the conduct with which
the student is charged is of such a nature and occurred in such circumstances as to warrant an immediate suspension for the protection
of persons or property; and (3) to give the student an opportunity to
meet with appropriate college officials as soon as possible, to be told
the nature of the evidence against him, and to be given an opportunity
to make any statement he might wish to make.79 If such a hearing is
provided, -the student may be suspended temporarily pending a subsequent full-dress hearing at which a more serious sanction might be
imposed.
'Under the procedure outlined above, a student may still be temporarily suspended without any hearing if it is impossible or highly
impractical for the university to hold even a preliminary hearing.80
But the corollary of this is that a student may not be summarily suspended simply because it is impossible for the university to hold a
formal hearing. For summary action, it must be impossible or highly
impractical to afford students not only formal 'hearings, but informal
"preliminary hearings" as well.
Lastly, courts in the past,8 1 including the court in Braxton, have
stated that a university is justified in acting summarily against a student
when the student's conduct poses a "threat to persons or property.)8 2
This raises the question of whether or not such a threat should be
considered a distinct requirement for summary action.
Such a requirement is unnecessary if instead it is required
that the student's conduct pose a substantial threat to the functioning
77.
1969).
78.
79.
80.
1969).
81.
82.

Stricklin v. Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis.
Id. at 420.
Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (W..D Wis. 1970).
Stricklin v. Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (W.D. Wis.
E.g., id.
10 Cal. 3d at 154, 514 P.2d at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
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of the university. The apparent rationale for requiring a threat to
persons or property is as a safeguard to ensure that a student will be
summarily suspended only in cases of grave or dangerous misconduct.
A similar safeguard is afforded by strict application of the requirement
that a student's conduct pose a substantial threat to the functioning of
the university. If a university is in a state of uproar, making the holding of disciplinary hearings impractical or impossible, any conduct
which poses a threat to persons or property will in turn, almost by
definition, pose a -threat to the functioning of the university. Moreover, by focusing on whether or not conduct poses a threat to the
functioning of the university, the validity of a university acting summarily is judged in terms of the very reasons that make summary action
necessary. During campus disruptions, the prime interest of the university is to alleviate the causes of the disruptions-to act swiftly against
the conduct which threatens its normal functioning. The requirement
that a student's conduct pose a substantial threat to the functioning of
the university not only ensures that a student will be summarily suspended only for grave misconduct, but that such summary action will
be limited only to those situations in which it is truly necessary."
Conclusion
This note has argued that summary exclusions can only be justified when a student's conduct (1) constitutes a substantial threat to
the functioning of a college or university, and (2) arises under circumstances which make the holding of either formal or informal hearings impossible or highly impractical. When applying these and other
due process standards courts today are faced with a fundamental
dilemma. As noted previously, the courts often consider the unique
and separate nature of the university as an important interest to be
protected when applying due process and other constitutional rights to
college campuses. As a part of this philosophy, the courts tend to disregard analogies to criminal or administrative law, and tend not to require that universities recognize and enforce the same standards and
penalties that prevail in the larger society. At the same time, state
legislatures, by passing legislation aimed at campus disruptions, have
expressed a contrary philosophy; specifically, such laws represent a
legislative judgment that members of the university community are to
83.

The requirement that a students' conduct pose a substantial threat to the

functioning of the university is similar to the tests courts use when First Amendment

rights are involved. The court in Braxton, for example, in order to meet the challenge
that Penal Code section 626.4 was overbroad, interpreted it to authorize summary exclusion only upon reasonable cause to believe that the person excluded had incited to

violence or engaged in conduct causing a substantial and material disruption of an educational institution.

10 Cal. 3d at 150, 514 P.2d at 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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be held accountable for their actions in the same manner as the rest of
society and that the universities are no longer to be treated as special
enclaves.8 4
The inevitable consequence of the state maintaining such inconsistent philosophies is inconsistent justice. On the one hand, the university's interest in informal and flexible disciplinary procedures is
protected by the judicial philosophy that universities are to be treated
as unique and separate from the larger society. At the same time,
the university is aided in handling disciplinary problems by legislation
which increases the liabilities imposed upon students for misconduct
and is justified in part by the rationale that the university is no longer
to be treated as separate and unique. The university benefits both
ways, and the student, of course, loses both ways: he is threatened
with increased liabilities for misconduct, and at the same time may be
denied formal procedural protections.
In light of the recent campus legislation, the courts must break
with the tradition of treating the university as a "special enclave."
Such a course may well entail applying due process rights to colleges
and universities in the same manner as they are applied in other areas
of the law and may, in turn, require the courts to grant students more
formal and extensive procedural protection. This is only equitable if
the legislatures are to increase the liabilities imposed upon students foi
misconduct. Indeed, in other areas of -the law the courts have shown
an increasing tendency to require hearings before the government acts
against individuals.8 5
The result of requiring more formal and extensive disciplinary
proceedings on college campuses may, of course, be the loss of the
flexibility and informality that the university often considers so important in carrying out its functions. While this may indeed be a
heavy loss, it may also be no more than a belated Tecognition of the
fact that the small closely-knit college community is fast disappearing
from American society. Today state-supported universities are often
vast and impersonal bureaucracies, at which tens of thousands of students have little or no personal contact with college officials.
84. See text following note 64 supra.
85. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hearing required before a driver's
license can be suspended); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (hearing
required before notices can be posted in liquor stores that a person is not to be sold
intoxicating beverages); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required before the termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S
337 (1969) (hearing required before a person's wages may be garnished); Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (hearing required before a person can be punished
for criminal contempt in the absence of exceptional circumstances); Escalera v. New
York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (hearing required before
tenancies in a public housing project may be terminated).
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Perhaps in light of the importance of the ideals of informality
and flexibility to college communities, the legislation aimed at campus
disruptions was ill-advised. That is not now the issue, however, for
the legislation exists. Rather the issue is whether in light of such legislation the courts may continue to protect to the same extent the
"special characteristics," uniqueness, and independence of the university when they balance the interests of the university against those of
the student in determining what is due process in the campus context.
To do so would be to ignore a fundamental change, and to expound
uneven and inconsistent justice.
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